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Abstract
An important body of scholarly work has been produced over recent decades to explain 
variation in levels and patterns of state punishment across and within different countries around 
the world. Two variables that have curiously evaded systematic attention in this regard are, 
first, the orientation of incumbent governments along the political spectrum, and second, the 
experience and fiscal implications of national economic downturn. Although recent years have 
seen both variables receive somewhat greater consideration, there is still precious little research 
into the effects on state punishment that they have in interaction with one another. With a 
view to helping fill this gap in the literature, this article identifies the direction and assesses 
the extent of influence exerted by government political orientation, on the one hand, and by 
economic downturn alongside its fiscal repercussions, on the other hand, upon the evolution of 
incarceration in the context of contemporary Greece. In so doing, we offer a uniquely detailed 
account of carceral trends before and during the period that a coalition government led by the 
left-wing Syriza party was in power. With regard to carceral trends, the scope of our analysis 
extends beyond conventional imprisonment also to include immigration detention. As well as 
arguing that economic downturn can place crucial limits on a government’s ability to execute 
progressive plans in carceral matters, we additionally conclude that a government’s scope of 
action in this vein may be further restricted depending on the autonomy it can wield in defiance 
of foreign forces intervening in both economic and political realms.
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Introduction
Over the last four decades or so, the spread as well as the harshness of state punishment 
have increased in many different parts of the world. Yet not all countries around the 
globe have experienced either or both of these trends, and some of those that have done 
so in the past appear latterly to have been reversing course. Although an important body 
of scholarly work has been produced to explain variation in levels and, to a lesser 
degree, patterns of punishment, especially with reference to imprisonment across or 
within select Western democracies, no consensus has as yet been reached as to the 
causes underlying the phenomena in question. More often than not, the ongoing debate 
has been focused on the ordering of, and the interrelationship between, the array of 
causal forces that have already been identified in pertinent research, including, for 
example, electoral interests, pressure-group lobbying, cultural shifts, economic sys-
tems, the scale and scope of socio-economic inequality, political and legal institutions, 
and international human rights pressures. Owing perhaps to the complexity of the task 
much less effort has been undertaken in terms of scrutinising and, as necessary, broad-
ening the range of those causes thereby arguably risking an insufficiently holistic inves-
tigation of the subject.
Two variables that have usually evaded systematic attention are, first, the orientation 
of incumbent governments along the political spectrum, and second, the experience and 
fiscal implications of national economic downturn. Although recent years have seen both 
variables receive somewhat greater consideration, there is still precious little research 
into the effects that they have on state punishment in interaction with one another. With 
a view to helping fill this gap in the literature, this article identifies the direction and 
assesses the extent of influence exerted by government political orientation, on the one 
hand, and by economic downturn alongside its fiscal repercussions, on the other hand, 
upon the evolution of incarceration in the context of contemporary Greece. In so doing, 
we offer a uniquely detailed account of carceral trends before and during the period that 
a coalition government led by the left-wing Syriza party was in power.
With regard to carceral trends, the scope of our analysis extends beyond conven-
tional imprisonment to include immigration detention as well; namely, the use of sepa-
rate, dedicated sites where irregular migrants from non-EU countries are detained for 
the purposes of administrative procedures relating to their immigration status, specifi-
cally deportation and asylum processing. This is not only due to the relationship of 
operational homology that has increasingly bound conventional imprisonment and 
immigration detention together, most evidently in the sense that sustained physical 
restrictions to free movement and other enforced deprivations commonly associated 
with the former have evolved into a prevalent feature of the latter, too (see, further, 
Peters and Turner, 2017; Loyd et al., 2012).1 It is also in recognition of the legislative 
conflation and functional equivalence that characterises these two forms of incarcera-
tion in the particular environment of Greece. First and foremost, under Greek law, 
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irregular entry and stay in the country are in themselves offences that can be treated as 
either administrative or criminal in nature, leading, respectively, to immigration deten-
tion awaiting deportation or to incarceration in a conventional prison and the acquiring 
of a criminal record, after which immigration detention and deportation can also fol-
low (as is similarly the case with completion of a sentence for any of a wide range of 
other offences) (see, further, Antonopoulou and Pitsela, 2014). By the first half of the 
2000s, for instance, as the number of foreign convicted prisoners was well on its way 
to exceeding the corresponding number of Greek nationals, roughly one in three for-
eigners was serving a sentence for irregular entry or stay in the country (Cheliotis, 
2013). Although this proportion has since fallen, irregular migrants have become more 
likely to be channelled directly to the growing migrant detention estate instead 
(Cheliotis, 2013, 2017). At the same time, the variations that continue to distinguish 
these otherwise similar forms of incarceration from one another – in terms, for instance, 
of the agencies involved in their enforcement or the international forces to which their 
use may be exposed – present us with an opportunity for a more nuanced, cross-secto-
ral comparative consideration of the relative significance of government political ori-
entation and economic downturn in carceral matters in Greece.
Contemporary Greece readily lends itself as a case study through which to advance 
understanding of how policies and practices of incarceration relate to the political orien-
tation of incumbent parties and the experience and fiscal ramifications of national eco-
nomic downturn. To begin with, by the mid-2010s, rates of conventional imprisonment 
had undergone a long-term rise in the country, at the same time that conditions inside 
Greek prisons had deteriorated dramatically. The use of administrative detention for 
irregular migrants was also increasing sharply, and the situation inside detention centres 
amounted to a humanitarian disaster. Against this background, the electoral victory of 
Syriza and the formation of a coalition government under its leadership in January 2015 
not only signalled an end to the dominance of the two centrist political parties – PASOK, 
on the centre-left, and New Democracy, on the centre-right – that had ruled Greece since 
the restoration of democracy in the country in 1974 (see, further, Featherstone and 
Papadimitriou, 2015; Pappas, 1999), but also opened up the possibility of a drastic 
change of course specifically in terms of levels and patterns of imprisonment and immi-
gration detention. This was because Syriza was known for its exceptional sensitivity to 
all matters carceral and its resolution to promote large-scale progressive reforms of penal 
and cognate state procedures, alongside its broader commitment to radically transform-
ing Greek politics and society as a whole. The juncture at which the Syriza-led govern-
ment assumed duties, however, was also a tipping point for the Greek economy: the 
country was in the midst of an incomparably extended period of deep economic reces-
sion, the implementation of the second bailout package the previous government had 
agreed with the so-called ‘Troika’ (that is, the European Commission, the European 
Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) had stalled, and the prospect of 
bankruptcy and exit from the Eurozone was looming over the horizon.
In effect, our analysis cuts across three different periods: the 35 or so years following 
the fall of the Colonels’ dictatorship, when long-term economic stability coincided with 
broad continuity in the political orientation of government, as PASOK and New 
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Democracy increasingly converged towards the centre while alternating in office; the 
shorter stretch between the late 2000s and the mid-2010s, when the emergence of eco-
nomic downturn in the country saw further continuity in government political orienta-
tion, with PASOK and New Democracy even joining forces in the context of a coalition; 
and the four-and-a-half-year spell thereafter, when sustained and deepening economic 
downturn was coeval with a decisive leftward shift in the political orientation of govern-
ment on account of Syriza’s entry into office as the senior partner of a coalition. The 
scope of our study, in other words, allows for the identification of a triad of combinations 
of different economic conditions and varying government political orientations. In prin-
ciple, these can then be compared with one another according to their respective carceral 
trends so as to sharpen our understanding of the nature and degree of influence that the 
interaction between the experience of economic downturn and the general ideological 
outlook of sitting parties has had on Greek carceral policy and practice. Although we do 
not have space in this article to offer systematic historical comparisons in this vein, we 
outline key pertinent observations in our conclusion. Our primary aim is rather to gauge 
the carceral effects of Syriza’s arrival in government, particularly how and the extent to 
which its plans for progressive reforms were affected by ongoing and intensifying eco-
nomic downturn and its fiscal repercussions. To this end, we also identify the direction 
and amount of influence exerted by an array of other forces in this regard, albeit not 
invariably across both conventional imprisonment and immigration detention.
Political orientation of government, economic downturn, 
and state punishment
Research has thus far identified no clear relationship between the ideological leanings of 
the incumbent party and state use of punishment. In the US, for example, the upward 
trajectory of imprisonment from the 1970s onwards has been shown to have been unre-
lated to whether state or national government was led by Republicans or by Democrats 
(Caplow and Simon, 1999; Gottschalk, 2016; Grumbach, 2018; compare Brown, 2013). 
Pointing in the same general direction are the findings from Karstedt et al.’s (2019) 
analysis of decarcerative legal reforms since the late 2000s across all 50 US states, which 
demonstrates that the introduction of such reforms has not been confined to Democrat-
controlled state governments, even though it has been comparatively more likely under 
them. Likewise, the overall ‘punitive drift’ in penal policy in the UK since the early 
1990s has been found to have been promoted by both the Conservatives and the Labour 
Party (Downes, 2001; Newburn, 2007; Reiner, 2007; Tonry, 2004).
Owing at least in part to such continuities having been revealed, relevant scholarship 
has sought to identify broader ideological orientations that have traversed rather than 
divided political parties in office, fuelling an intensification of state punishment as they 
have done so. A simultaneous commitment to neoliberal economics and neo-conserva-
tive morality has received especial attention in this respect, with the majority of com-
mentators arguing that allegiance to neoliberalism on the economic front has presaged 
and even necessitated the enactment of neo-conservative principles in terms of penal 
policy and practice (see, for example, Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Wacquant, 2009; 
compare Farrall and Jennings, 2014). There is, however, some research to suggest that 
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the adverse effect of neo-conservative culture on state punishment has been unrelated to 
economic neoliberalisation (see, for example, De Koster et al., 2008).
The primacy of economic forces over sitting parties’ political orientation can also be 
deduced from the small but growing body of literature on the relationship between eco-
nomic downturn and state punishment, although here the focus has increasingly been on 
the ameliorative effects the former may have on the latter, particularly as regards impris-
onment in the US context over the last decade or so. It has thus been argued that a prin-
cipal reason why a majority of US states have in recent years experienced an end to the 
long-term expansion of their use of imprisonment and a reduction in the size of their 
respective custodial populations is that the fiscal crises they underwent following nation-
wide economic recessions in 2001 and 2008 facilitated the ascent of politicians with a 
stronger commitment to budgetary retrenchment and enabled the mobilisation of cross-
party support for decarceration on monetary grounds (Aviram, 2015; Dagan and Teles, 
2014; Schrantz et al., 2018; but see also Melossi, 2021). The aforementioned study by 
Karstedt et al. (2019) lends at least partial support to this claim, inasmuch as it demon-
strates that states with a higher outstanding debt were more likely to be set on a trajectory 
towards decarcerative reforms (see also Brown, 2013). One might, in fact, locate traces 
of a similar phenomenon having occurred more latterly in the UK, where the rate of 
imprisonment first stabilised and then began to fall during a period of budgetary austerity 
that itself followed the national recession of 2018 (see, further, House of Commons 
Justice Committee, 2019; also Box, 1987).
On the other hand, once the focus of attention shifts beyond conventional imprison-
ment to other forms of incarceration, or even when conventional imprisonment is sub-
jected to closer scrutiny, whether in terms of disaggregated levels or with regard to the 
conditions in which prisoners are held, it is less clear that economic downturn in general 
and the imposition of budgetary constraints in particular necessarily work to reduce state 
punishment. In the US, for instance, the recent decline in prisoner numbers has coincided 
not just with budgetary retrenchment as a result of economic downturn but also with the 
decentralisation and diffusion of punishment to local and private institutions of confine-
ment, where oversight of conditions and support facilities are scant (Cate, 2016; Kang-
Brown and Subramanian, 2017; Lynch and Verma, 2016; Martin, 2016). Also not 
reflected in the overall drop in the US prisoner population has been the counter-trend of 
rapidly rising numbers of confined children and their inhumane treatment, albeit chiefly 
under migrant detention (ACF, 2020; Nowak, 2019; Peeler et al., 2020). Similarly, in 
England and Wales, prisoner numbers appear to have fallen while conditions of impris-
onment have worsened (Ismail, 2019; Ministry of Justice, 2020; Tomczak, 2019). 
Although such findings do not cast doubt on the notion that the political orientation of 
incumbent parties is trumped by economic forces, they do imply that the relationship 
between political orientation, economic conditions and state punishment is best under-
stood when state punishment is conceptualised in a multi-dimensional manner.
In sum, the extant literature offers conflicting findings regarding the impact of either 
the political orientation of government or economic downturn on state punishment. In 
what follows, we seek to reflect on the effects that the emergence of a left-led govern-
ment had on carceral policy and practice in the context of crisis-hit Greece. We begin by 
discussing the expected significance of the government in question, before going on to 
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assess its actual impact on incarceration, first in relation to conventional imprisonment 
and then in relation to migrant detention.
Greece’s economic crisis and the ascent of Syriza-led 
government
Economic upheaval began in Greece with the 2008 downturn, which affected many 
countries internationally. At least within the European Union, however, no other state 
experienced so deep or prolonged a crisis as Greece (see, for example, Matsaganis, 
2018). By the time that a Syriza-led coalition government was formed in January 2015, 
the Greek economy was getting closer and closer to collapse.
In an effort to manage the inordinate size of Greece’s sovereign debt and overcome 
the country’s consequent inability to access bond markets, previous governments had 
already received two bailout packages from the Troika, the first in 2010 and the second 
in 2012. Each of those packages had come, on the one hand, with a broad range of strict 
conditions such as austerity measures, the further deregulation of the labour market, the 
sale of valuable public assets, and in-depth public administration reforms; and, on the 
other hand, with heavy involvement on the part of creditors in domestic policy-making 
more generally and their close oversight of the implementation of the measures at issue 
(Ioannidis, 2014). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the Troika’s intervention was 
harsher in Greece – whether in terms of the content of the specific measures demanded, 
control over broader policy design dealing with social and economic matters, or super-
vision of pertinent implementation procedures – than in other countries of the European 
periphery (Clifton et al., 2018). Towards the end of 2014, as the Greek economy tum-
bled further into recession and public anger intensified about the impact of austerity and 
foreign meddling in Greece’s internal affairs, implementation of the second loan pack-
age stalled.
Snap elections were called soon thereafter, with Syriza campaigning as an anti-auster-
ity party that would tear up the excoriating bailout agreements and take ‘immediate 
measures to fight the humanitarian crisis’, in reference to the worsened rates of unem-
ployment, poverty, deprivation and ill health in Greek society at the time (Matsaganis, 
2018). Although Syriza won the elections with 36.3 percent of the vote and was thereby 
catapulted firmly into a leading role in national Greek politics, it still fell two seats short 
of an outright majority. The party nevertheless managed to assume office thanks to a 
coalition it quickly formed with Independent Greeks (ANEL), a small far-rightist party 
with deeply reactionary views on a range of issues, not least on matters of law and order 
and immigration, yet one that shared Syriza’s anti-austerity agenda and its open opposi-
tion to foreign intervention in domestic affairs. As has typically been the case with the 
few coalition governments to have emerged in Greece since the restoration of democracy 
in the country in 1974, the status of the senior partner allowed Syriza to retain a tight grip 
over nearly all government business. Indeed, only one cabinet portfolio (that of the 
Ministry of Defence) was allocated to the junior partner as payoff for its participation in 
government (see, further, Tsatsanis and Teperoglou, 2019).
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The Syriza-led coalition government went on to reject the terms of the second loan 
package, to which the Troika responded by shutting off the transfer of liquidity to Greek 
banks. Although a four-month extension of the loan agreement was subsequently agreed, 
its termination point was breached in June 2015, reportedly making Greece the first 
advanced economy to technically default on a loan from the International Monetary 
Fund. The country was thrown into a liquidity crisis and found itself on the brink of 
bankruptcy and exit from the Eurozone. Stringent bailout conditions proposed by the 
Troika were then put to the people in a referendum held in early July. However, although 
Syriza openly campaigned in favour of a ‘No’ vote and celebrated its resounding victory 
in public, the Syriza-led government proceeded to strike an agreement with the Troika 
for a new, third financial package that was even more biting in its requirements than the 
one rejected in the referendum itself. The bill that formally enacted the third package was 
passed only with votes from opposition parties, as dozens of Syriza MPs chose not to toe 
the party line. In an effort to purge dissenters and secure a retrospective mandate for what 
was widely being described amongst the Left as a humiliating capitulation, the govern-
ment called snap elections for September.
Because the combination of inflowing centrist votes and an extremely high abstention 
rate helped to counterbalance the electoral repercussions of en masse defections from the 
party, Syriza once more won the majority at the ballot box, at 35.4 percent, yet not the 
number of seats required to govern on its own. Just as before, a coalition was immedi-
ately forged with the Independent Greeks as a weak partner, and Syriza was back at the 
helm of the country, its strategy being to implement the loan agreement while at the same 
time running a ‘parallel programme’ of welfare measures that would cushion the impact 
of austerity on the poorest segments of the population. Syriza stayed in power until July 
2019, when it lost the next national election to the right-of-centre New Democracy party 
by a wide margin. Syriza’s defeat came, at least in part, as a result of growing ire amongst 
the public, and especially amongst leftist constituencies, regarding the introduction in 
May 2017 of further austerity measures in the context of what was in effect, but not in 
name, a fourth bailout package dictated by the Troika.
Waiting for the Left: Why hope was ‘on the way’ with 
Syriza
The ascent of Syriza into office raised the prospect of a new, less punitive and more 
humane direction in the Greek state’s use of incarceration. This was due to a combination 
of three factors: first, the composition of the core of the party’s membership; second, 
modes of activism in which prominent members of the party had long been regularly 
engaged; and third, the substance and tenor of the party’s manifesto in the build-up to the 
election of early 2015.
From its very beginning in 2004, Syriza established itself as a political force deeply 
concerned with promoting grassroots reforms to criminal justice in general and the prison 
system in particular, a concern that gradually extended to issues relating to immigration 
detention as well. This was no surprise given that Syriza emerged from a coalition of 
leftist political parties and currents that counted amongst their members committed cam-
paigners for human rights in carceral sites and beyond, but also, more generally, people 
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with heightened sensitivities to issues of punishment, often as a result of direct or indi-
rect experience of punitive treatment at the hands of authoritarian regimes in the past, be 
it in the form of imprisonment, exile or torture (or a combination of those).
In addition, while Syriza was still in the opposition, several eminent members of the 
party regularly mobilised to help bring about progressive changes to carceral conditions 
or, indeed, a shift towards decarceration: from visiting carceral sites to inspect them first-
hand, to taking to the streets to participate in protests against known gross violations of 
the rights of incarcerated populations, to using mainstream and other media platforms to 
sensitise the broader public and to force sitting parties to consider taking liberalising 
measures. In this broader context, Syriza also openly campaigned in favour of high-
profile prisoners with known political leanings towards the Left. To take the most well-
known example, in late 2013 the party issued a public statement in support of Savvas 
Xiros, a nearly blind and almost deaf amputee serving multiple life sentences for offences 
related to his involvement in the Revolutionary Organisation November 17, who was at 
the time applying for suspension of his imprisonment on grounds of ill health (see, fur-
ther, Cheliotis, 2012; Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2016).
Such actions were typically met with sustained criticism from parties in the centre 
and, even more so, on the right end of the political spectrum, purportedly for showing 
softness on crime and a sympathising stance towards terrorism. Syriza nevertheless pro-
ceeded to give carceral moderation, and at least in part also abolition, high visibility in 
its campaign for the election held in January 2015. Propagated under slogans such as 
‘Hope is on the Way’ and ‘First Time Left’, Syriza’s manifesto comprised a long series 
of promises bound together by a concern for redressing what it described as widespread 
injustice and restoring dignity, especially for the most disadvantaged. Promises were 
clustered around three policy domains: the first, as suggested earlier, was economy and 
society, starting with debt restructuring, which would in turn facilitate an end to austerity 
and help enhance welfare provision for the poorest families; the second was public 
administration, with a particular focus on tackling corruption and unnecessary red tape; 
and the third was human rights, ranging from the legalisation of same-sex marriage and 
the introduction of laws to protect minorities from hate speech and criminal victimisa-
tion, to an array of reforms relating, whether directly or indirectly, to incarceration. These 
last reforms spanned reducing the prison population, abolishing the maximum-security 
prisons programme that the previous government had introduced towards the end of its 
tenure, providing second-generation migrants with citizenship, expediting the asylum 
application process, putting an end to the systematic and arbitrary detention of undocu-
mented migrants, and replacing closed administrative detention centres with open facili-
ties (see, further, Douzinas, 2017; Tsakatika, 2016).
Optimism was further fuelled in the immediate aftermath of the election and the for-
mulation of a coalition government headed by Syriza, at which point several ministerial 
positions were filled by people with personal or family histories of political resistance 
and subjection to punishment under the Colonels’ dictatorship. Moreover, the Ministry of 
Justice (and with it the responsibility for prison policy) was allocated to Nikos 
Paraskevopoulos, a criminal law professor with a long-term interest in prisoners’ rights, 
and the post of Alternate Minister for Migration Policy (which included responsibility 
for immigration detention matters) was given to Tasia Christodoulopoulou, a respected 
lawyer and human rights activist.
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Before the Left: Imprisonment before Syriza in power
By the time that Syriza was on the verge of assuming office as the senior partner in a 
coalition government in January 2015, the use of imprisonment in Greece had under-
gone a long-term rise. The caseload of convicted and remand prisoners had increased 
by 120.5 percent over the previous three decades, from 9114 (or 92 per 100,000 inhab-
itants) in 1985 to 20,099 (or 184 per 100,000 inhabitants) in 2014, rising especially 
sharply from 2000 onwards.2 The overall growth of the prisoner caseload had been 
reflective of a rise in the caseload specifically of convicted prisoners, and particularly 
of those amongst them serving longer sentences (see Figure 1). Equally importantly, 
however, it was foreigners who had borne the brunt in this regard. From 1996, when 
relevant data were first made available, to 2014, the caseload of non-Greek convicts 
rose by a spectacular 288.3 percent, from 2253 to 8750, with the proportion of non-
Greeks in the country’s caseload of convicted prisoners coming to exceed that of 
Greeks themselves, rising from 25.3 to 55.0 percent. Leaving aside immigration-
related convictions, the above trends are to be explained by reference to reforms that 
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Figure 1. Annual incidence rate (caseload per 100,000) of imprisonment in Greece, 1974–2014.
Source of primary data: National Statistical Service of Greece, Statistical Yearbook and Justice Statistics. 
Note: The data were compiled and analysed by the authors.
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police activity and punitive decision-making on the part of judges, particularly against 
non-Greeks (see, further, Cheliotis, 2011; Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2010, 2016; Xenakis 
and Cheliotis, 2013).3
Prisoner numbers kept on growing at such pace over the years that serious prison 
overcrowding was inevitable. Partly as a consequence of overcrowding, and partly owing 
to a continuing lack of state provision, conditions of imprisonment grew increasingly 
deplorable, ranging from insufficient floor space, limited sanitation, and lack of ventila-
tion and hot water, to unsuitable room temperature, poor hygiene and minimal healthcare 
provision (see, further, Cheliotis, 2011, 2012). Both the problems bedevilling conditions 
in Greek prisons and the Greek state’s persistent failure to improve them became subject 
to a long series of damning reports by the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) and a host of national 
and international non-governmental organisations and media outlets. Meanwhile, pris-
oner unrest and even riots became increasingly frequent, and there was a steady upsurge 
from the 2000s onwards not just in the volume of applications lodged with the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) by prisoners claiming they had suffered inhuman or 
degrading treatment in Greek prisons, but also in the number of convictions and fines the 
ECtHR meted out to Greece in this regard (see, further, Cheliotis, 2012; Xenakis and 
Cheliotis, 2018).
Such pressures, however, did little to help reverse the course of the country’s prison 
policy and practice. Successive Greek governments typically responded to criticism with 
a combination of denial and defiance (Cheliotis, 2012; Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2018), in 
a context where the country continued to have one of the poorest records in implement-
ing ECtHR judgments (Anagnostou and Mungiu-Pippidi, 2014). When the Syriza-led 
coalition was installed in government in early 2015, the Greek prison system was close 
to ‘breaking point’, as the CPT concluded in a report it produced based on inspection of 
several Greek prisons at the time. Indeed, the Committee noted that ‘[t]he situation has 
now deteriorated to the point where over and above the serious ill-treatment concerns 
under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights [which prohibits inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment], there are very real right-to-life issues under 
Article 2, inasmuch as vulnerable prisoners are not being cared for and, in some cases, 
are being allowed to die’ (CPT, 2016: 2).
The only front on which some substantive remedial effort had occasionally been 
undertaken by past governments concerned specifically prison overcrowding. Often 
introduced in spasmodic response to prisoner rioting, initiatives in this regard neverthe-
less tended to be temporary in nature and purely managerial in orientation, insofar as 
they were solely meant to deal with a particular practical problem at hand. In terms of 
content, they mainly consisted of legislative interventions intended at least temporarily 
to reduce prisoner numbers, either by restricting ‘front-door’ entries into the prison sys-
tem or by promoting ‘back-door’ releases from it. That prison overcrowding remained 
severe anyway was because of self-defeating provisions usually contained within such 
legislation itself (for example, overly restrictive definitions of parole eligibility) and, 
even more so, due to conservative resistance on the part of the judiciary. That is to say, 
judges typically reacted to decarcerative blips in government policy by increasing their 
recourse to long-term custodial sentences, continuing to order pre-trial detention at 
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excessive rates, and persisting in making limited use of options of early release (see, 
further, Cheliotis, 2010, 2011; Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2018).
Such an effort to reduce prison overcrowding was actually under way in the build-up 
to the national elections of January 2015 that brought Syriza to power, as legislative 
amendments had been passed since 2012 under the coalition government led by right-of-
centre New Democracy to facilitate release on parole for various categories of prisoners. 
Indeed, by 2014, these amendments appeared to have borne fruit in terms of lowering 
prisoner numbers, although prison overcrowding was still very high. One-day snapshots 
published by the Greek Ministry of Justice, for example, show the total prisoner popula-
tion to have fallen by 7 percent that year. Despite the fact that the measures in question 
were not reflective of a broader shift in policy, and they were, in fact, taken along with a 
plethora of punitive other initiatives (not least the bill passed in July 2014 to establish 
maximum-security prisons and block access to release on temporary licence for offend-
ers convicted of serious crimes and violations of anti-terrorism laws), the reduction they 
seemed to have helped bring about in the prisoner population was a welcome develop-
ment for a party that was soon to enter office and seek to promote a broader and progres-
sive reform agenda relating to prison matters.
With the Left at the helm: Prison reform under Syriza
One of the first major pieces of legislation that the Syriza-led government brought to 
parliament was a bill whose central aims were, first, to abolish maximum-security 
prisons; second, to promote drug rehabilitation treatment for prisoners in need, for 
example by facilitating their voluntary participation in relevant schemes; and third, to 
reduce the use of custodial punishment and relieve prison overcrowding through an array 
of measures such as limiting the range of imprisonable offences for young people, setting 
limits to the prolonged detention of foreigners facing deportation after expiry of the cus-
tody term set by courts, and relaxing the eligibility criteria for parole, including for 
elderly and disabled prisoners. Although the bill in question was not exhaustive of the 
scope of prison reform that Syriza had been planning to effectuate, its passage and suc-
cessful implementation were deemed vital to progressing with a series of further meas-
ures in due course so as eventually to accomplish a major overhaul of the country’s 
prison system as a whole.
Not unexpectedly, a bitter conflict immediately ensued both in parliament and in the 
mass media. Syriza stood alone amongst elected parties, justifying the proposed bill by 
invoking humanitarian principles and pointing to the monetary and symbolic implications 
that relevant ECtHR rulings carried for the country. The other parliamentary forces – 
including Syriza’s junior coalition partner – expressed a variety of disagreements, some of 
which were also echoed by powerful judicial circles such as the Greek Union of 
Prosecutors. The most controversial aspects of the bill proved to be the scrapping of max-
imum-security establishments and the provision that facilitated access to early release on 
health grounds. The former, critics argued, indicated undue leniency towards hardened 
criminals and terrorists, and the latter would specifically allow Savvas Xiros, a prominent 
member of Greece’s long-standing urban guerrilla group November 17, to be freed under 
house arrest.
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With memories still very much alive of US targets having been attacked by November 
17, the US government also weighed in to push against the passage of the bill. To start 
with, US Secretary of State John Kerry conveyed his country’s concerns in a phone-call 
directly with Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, as did the US Ambassador to Athens, 
David Pearce, in the communication he had with the Greek Minister of Justice. Realising 
that private diplomatic efforts of this kind were to no avail, however, the Americans 
began to increase their pressure on the Greek side and to do so in the public eye. Most 
notably, on the morning of the very day that the bill was tabled in parliament for a final 
vote, Ambassador Pearce held a widely covered press conference about the matter, dur-
ing which he condemned the early release provisions of the bill in general and urged the 
Greek government to shut down any prospect of Xiros being paroled in particular. ‘If 
Savvas Xiros – or anyone else with the blood of American diplomats and US Mission 
members on their hands – leaves prison, it will be seen as a profoundly unfriendly act. 
. . . We believe this legislation is inconsistent with [our] partnership [with Greece]’, he 
characteristically said (Ovenden, 2015: 144; see also Smith, 2015).
There was little doubt Pearce’s intervention contained a lightly disguised threat that 
the Greek government would be denied the support it had been hoping to obtain from the 
Americans in what had meanwhile become drawn-out negotiations with European credi-
tors to save its debt-stricken economy from collapse. All this pressure notwithstanding, 
and with the junior coalition partner’s support secured, the bill did pass as proposed.4 The 
saga was far from over, however. In light of the discontent already openly expressed by 
the US, the leading opposition party and the phalanx of media outlets that were friendly 
to it doubled down on their criticism against the Greek government’s prison reform 
plans, now claiming that the senior coalition partner’s alleged sympathy for criminals 
and terrorists was not just putting public security at risk, but was also, more broadly, 
jeopardising the country’s geopolitical interests and economic prospects (see, for exam-
ple, Kathimerini, 21 April 2015). Further fuel for such views was provided by the 
Americans themselves, who instantly responded to the passage of the bill with renewed 
public expressions of dismay and concern.
When, against this background, the issue was brought up in a televised interview with 
the Greek Prime Minister, the latter sought to reassure the public that ‘the difference in 
views about the Xiros case has not harmed Greece’s relations with the US, nor the align-
ment of the two countries on the issue of the negotiations about the economy’. Concrete 
support from Washington was not forthcoming, however, and criticism of the prison reform 
bill continued unabated until the very end of the Syriza-led government’s tenure in office, 
initially with regard to Xiros’ impending discharge (which he ended up rejecting himself on 
ideological grounds relating to the supervisory conditions he would have had to satisfy) 
and then with reference to what was described, typically in dramatic terms, as a rise in com-
mon crime stemming from the expanded use of parole for hardcore criminals.
Initial appearances to the contrary, however, it is questionable whether the bill delivered 
much by way of its intended decarcerative effects. The caseload of convicted prisoners 
released on parole increased by 13.6 percent between 2014 and 2015, from 4510 to 5123. 
Indeed, both the absolute number of convicted prisoners who were released on parole in 
2015 and the proportion they constituted of the total caseload of convicted prisoners that 
year (at 34.6 percent) were the highest to have been recorded in Greece during the long 
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period since the fall of the junta in 1974. Between 2014 and 2015, there was also a 6.9 
percent drop in the volume of admissions to prison under conviction, from 6481 to 6036, 
which accounts for the decline this period saw both in the total of prison admissions (by 3.7 
percent) and, to a significant degree, in the total caseload of prisoners (by 6.1 percent).
At the time of writing, caseload data were available only up to 2015. One-day snap-
shot measurements nevertheless allow for a fuller appreciation – and, in fact, paint a 
more complicated picture – of the impact that the prison reform bill had on the use of 
imprisonment in the country. On the one hand, these data indicate that Greece’s total 
prisoner population underwent an extraordinary 15.6 percent reduction within a mere 
three months immediately after the bill was passed (from 11,447 on 1 May 2015 to 9660 
on 1 August 2015), with the most notable drops recorded amongst male and foreign pris-
oners. The reduction achieved within those months largely accounts for the 18.5 percent 
drop in the prisoner population for the year 2015 as a whole, itself the largest annual 
contraction in the country’s prisoner population to have been recorded (with reference to 
one-day snapshots) since the restoration of democracy in 1974.
Not only was this development in line with the pledges Syriza had repeatedly made 
on the campaign trail with regard to penal policy; it also reflected the party’s desire to 
demonstrate in practice its broader commitment to forging a radical break with the poli-
tics and policies of past governments. This was especially so under conditions in which, 
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Figure 2. GDP growth, debt-to-GDP ratio and the rate of imprisonment in Greece, 2000-2019.
Sources of data: World Bank (GDP growth); OECD (debt-to-GDP ratio); Greek Ministry of Justice (one-day 
snapshots of the prisoner population).
Notes: For presentational purposes, the GDP growth series has been plotted on a secondary axis. Rates of 
imprisonment per 100,000 population were calculated by the authors.
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the rate of national GDP growth slipping back to being negative and the country’s ability 
to service the enormous debt it had acquired continuing to worsen.
On the other hand, at no point since the passage of the bill did total prisoner numbers 
cease being high; throughout this period, for example, they were comparable to the num-
bers previously experienced when imprisonment was soaring in the mid- to late 2000s 
(see Figure 2). Moreover, the fall in prisoner numbers was anything but persistent or 
comprehensive. Overall, between 1 January 2015 (a few months before the bill was 
passed) and 1 January 2019 (a few months before the Syriza-led government stepped 
down), the total prisoner population declined by 9.7 percent (from 11,798 to 10,654). This 
was a result of a 21.3 percent reduction specifically in the number of convicted prisoners, 
which overshadowed the 34.2 percent increase in the number of pre-trial detainees. But 
the prisoner population had already stabilised by 2016, before returning to an upward 
course thereafter (see Figure 2). Similarly, the number of convicted prisoners had in effect 
plateaued by 2017, and resumed an upward trajectory in 2018, paralleling, from that point 
onwards, the rise in the number of pre-trial detainees, which had been continuing all along.
What is more, although the number of convicted prisoners underwent an overall 
decline, the share of prisoners serving long terms actually increased significantly. At the 
beginning of 2015, for instance, the proportion of prisoners on sentences of five years 
and above was 78.6 percent of the total convicted prisoner population; at the beginning 
of 2019, it was up at 88.9 percent. In effect, then, the Syriza-led coalition government’s 
prison reform bill was undermined by judicial practice both in the sense that judges con-
tinued ordering pre-trial detention at excessive rates and also in that they expanded their 
imposition of long-term custodial sentences.
Stubbornly high prisoner numbers, in combination with the fact that the rise in the 
operational capacity of the prison system was only negligible during the years under 
consideration, meant that prison overcrowding was bound to remain severe; indeed, at 
one of the highest levels by European comparison (Aebi and Tiago, 2018). But over-
crowding was far from the only enduring problem in Greek prisons while the Syriza-led 
coalition was in power. Despite some positive developments in certain establishments, 
most notably the institution of a dedicated drug rehabilitation unit in the prison of Diavata 
in northern Greece and the strengthening of cognate services in a select number of pris-
ons elsewhere in the country, the overall situation did not cease being dire.
Accounts produced by the Greek Ombudsman, segments of the mass media and pris-
oner rights groups point to an array of persisting deficiencies, such as grossly insufficient 
healthcare, poor hygiene, inadequate food provision, and limited heating (see, for exam-
ple, Efimerida ton Syntakton, 18 September 2016; Greek Ombudsman, 2019; To Pontiki, 
9 October 2016). After a brief initial grace period, prisoner protests resumed and the 
country kept on attracting convictions at the ECtHR for violations of Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (see, for example, Greek Ombudsman, 
2019: 36). The preliminary findings reached by the United Nations Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention (n.d.) based on its inspection of Greek prisons in December 2019 
suggest that little progress was achieved before the coalition left office just a few months 
earlier. Prison conditions in Greece, the Working Group concluded, did ‘not generally 
meet international standards, particularly the Mandela Rules’.
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It is impossible to understand why the Syriza-led government failed to make sufficient 
headway towards improving prison conditions without considering that it found itself 
severely restricted under the Troika’s tutelage as to both the overall size and the specific 
distribution of public funding it could utilise for prisons. To illustrate the point, it is neces-
sary first to state some basic facts about the levels and patterns of prison funding per se.
For one, while the Syriza-led coalition was in power, yearly trends in budget alloca-
tion to the operation of prisons and in actual payments made by the Greek state in this 
regard largely mirrored the trajectory of the prisoner population itself. To this extent, 
there was no substantial shift in prison budgets and payments during the period at issue, 
which obviously put serious limitations on the scope and depth of the reforms that could 
be applied to prison conditions.
What further jeopardised such reforms was the fact that the budgets allocated and the 
payments made by the Greek state specifically for the provision of basic necessities and 
capital goods for prisoners (for example, medicines, hygiene products, heating, food, and 
workshop equipment) were kept meagre, at levels ranking amongst the lowest by 
European comparison (see, further, Aebi and Tiago, 2018; Aebi et al., 2017). Indeed, 
although the budget for prisoner-related costs experienced a slight overall rise, the rele-
vant payments actually declined year on year, which, in turn, meant that budget under-
spending widened on this front under Syriza-led government. The drop in payments and 
the increase in underspending were especially conspicuous in 2018, when only 64.3 
percent of the total budget earmarked for prisoner-related expenses was actually spent, 
down from 85.2 percent in 2015 and 85.3 percent in 2011.5
What lay behind not just the sluggish trends in terms of budgets but also the decline 
in prisoner-related payments and the attendant spike in underspending were the eco-
nomic controls and related pressures the Troika had been placing on Greece in its capac-
ity as the country’s bailout lender. On the one hand, under the harsh terms of the loan 
agreement reached in the summer of 2015, the Troika did not only afford the Syriza-led 
government no leeway over budget formulation, it was also able to quash the govern-
ment’s stated plans to increase public funding for a broad range of badly needed welfare-
oriented measures. Although the Troika did include reforms to the justice system amongst 
the public management demands it made of Greece, the reforms in question were focused 
not on criminal justice, let alone on prisons, but rather on modernising administrative 
and tax court procedures in order to support economic activity.
On the other hand, the Syriza-led government was essentially pushed into a Catch-22 
situation, whereby intensification of ministerial budget underspending on a broad array 
of public investment fronts was the only readily available option it had for making a 
plausible appeal to the Troika for a desperately needed break from further austerity and 
at least some longed-for debt relief. Albeit also linked to chronic bureaucratic inefficien-
cies, budget underspending on public investment was a key way in which Greece had 
previously managed to meet the stringent targets imposed by the Troika in terms of 
annual primary budget surpluses, itself a crucial prerequisite for the sustained inflow of 
tranches of vital bailout funds (European Commission, 2019a, 2019b).
In 2018, however, as the devastating effects of continuing austerity accumulated and 
spread across Greek society, but also with the next national election now approaching, 
the Syriza-led government doubled down on its under-execution of public expenditure in 
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order to exceed what by that point was the highest Troika-mandated fiscal target of its 
tenure in office; that is, a primary budget surplus of 3.5 percent of GDP (European 
Commission, 2019a: 21). Indeed, no other Greek government in the bailout era had 
underused public investment budgets to the extent that the Syriza-led coalition did that 
year (see, for example, European Commission, 2019b: 20). The rationale underlying this 
seemingly absurd move was that over-achieving so high a fiscal target would help per-
suade the Troika that further austerity measures were no longer necessary (most notably 
in the form of scheduled pension cuts) and that debt relief was at last feasible in the 
Greek case. To this extent, persisting problems in prison conditions were yet another 
form of collateral damage in the Syriza-led government’s ongoing struggle against its 
international creditor for a stable and sustainable domestic economy, as well as for a halt 
to further degradation in the living conditions of the average Greek person.
All in all, then, the prison reform aspirations of the Syriza-led coalition government – 
or, to be more precise, of Syriza as the senior partner of the coalition – were mostly 
crushed between the Scylla of judicial obstinacy and the Charybdis of external eco-
nomic intervention. Throughout its stay in office, Syriza kept on trying to push 
through its reform agenda, albeit, of necessity, mainly by way of sporadic and small-
scale measures that were beyond the grasp of either the judiciary or the Troika (for 
example, repurposing existing resources to strengthen drug rehabilitation programmes 
in some prisons). Although the party and, by extension, the government in practice 
continued treating the Troika as an invincible force, they did eventually seek to fight 
back against, and enforce limits to, the obstructive discretionary powers of judges by 
passing an amendment to the country’s Penal Code that reduced maximum sentence 
lengths. But this move, carried out as late as 2019, turned out to be no more than a 
parting shot; it was, in fact, the last major legislative action taken by the Syriza-led 
coalition on any policy front before the elections that brought it down in July that 
year. No sooner did right-of-centre New Democracy return to power than it began 
undoing key legislative and other measures through which its predecessor had endeav-
oured to change the Greek prison system for the better.
Migrant detention and human rights before Syriza
In the 1980s, Greece transformed from a country of emigration to a country of immigra-
tion, albeit predominantly as one of the main gateways to the EU for irregular migrants. 
Over the following three decades, the country proceeded to take an obstructive position 
on regularisation and, more generally, to resist the establishment of administrative capa-
bilities that would ensure the management of irregular migration in an efficient and 
effective fashion. When the financial crisis broke in the late 2000s, the rate of asylum 
applications to Greece was the highest in Europe, whilst the country maintained one of 
the lowest rates of refugee recognition on the continent and one of the highest rates of 
pending asylum cases worldwide (Cheliotis, 2013, 2017).
Meanwhile, although there is no clarity as to the precise numbers of irregular 
migrants held in administrative detention at the time, conditions of migrant detention 
had given rise to increasing alarm amongst national and international human rights 
bodies. Human Rights Watch and CPT reports, for example, repeatedly told of 
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overcrowding, extremely poor sanitation, little to no access to medical services, and 
physical ill-treatment on a frequent basis, distress about all of which sometimes led to 
protests that were met with violent police reaction (Cheliotis, 2013; Kalpouzos and 
Mann, 2015; Nowak, 2019). As these conditions persisted, the number of convictions 
Greece received from the ECtHR for related violations of Article 3 of the ECHR 
increased. Indeed, in January 2011, the ECtHR ruled that detention practices in Greece 
were such that the Dublin II Agreement should be suspended so that other EU member-
states cease transferring migrants who had entered the EU via Greece back to the 
country (Koutsouraki, 2017; Nowak, 2019).
The election of a right-of-centre New Democracy government in June 2012 marked 
the start of an increased use of detention to address irregular migration in the country. 
Against a background of intensifying xenophobia and deep financial crisis, the Greek 
government introduced the 2012 Action Plan on Asylum and Migration Management, a 
revised version of which was put to the European Commission in January 2013. The plan 
promised a modernised asylum system with improved protections for vulnerable 
migrants, and an increase in detention capacity of 4500 places – a three-fold expansion 
of space – through the launch of new dedicated immigration detention facilities (many 
termed ‘pre-removal detention centres’), as well as reception and identification centres 
(RICs), the latter mostly operating as so-called ‘hotspots’ on the Aegean islands. Under 
the new plan, migrants were systematically to be placed in detention as a direct conse-
quence of their irregular status, and the system was rolled out shortly after the launch of 
a police operation of unprecedented magnitude to capture and detain irregular migrants 
around the country. However, degrading conditions inside detention sites remained, so 
much so that mass detainee protests became commonplace (Cheliotis, 2013; Koutsouraki, 
2017; Mavrikos-Adamou, 2017).
Syriza entered government at a juncture when irregular migration was swelling, and 
was shortly to reach unprecedented proportions. Already, following a hardening of controls 
at the country’s land border with Turkey under the previous government in 2013, record 
numbers of irregular migrants had arrived via Greece’s sea border with Turkey in 2014.
Migrant detention under Syriza
On entering office, Syriza transformed state discourse around irregular migrants by 
pushing for consistent referencing of their human rights, centred around the notion that 
‘no migrant is illegal’ (Nestoras, 2016; Skleparis, 2017). On the policy front, in February 
2015, just three weeks after beginning its tenure, the government introduced a range of 
measures designed to reduce the use of immigration detention and to alleviate conditions 
within detention sites. A prior ministerial decision allowing for detention beyond 18 
months was revoked, and those held pursuant to that decision were immediately released, 
along with detainees judged to belong to vulnerable groups. Additionally, the maximum 
period of detention was limited to 6 months (Koutsouraki, 2017).
These measures did reduce the numbers of those detained, which, in its turn, helped 
tackle the problem of overcrowding in a large number of detention sites around the coun-
try. A CPT inspection in April 2015, for example, found that the four operational centres 
were holding 988 persons for a capacity of 5033, and another 2000 irregular migrants 
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were being held in police stations and special holding facilities with a capacity of approx-
imately 5500. As the same CPT mission discovered, however, the inadequacies of the 
Greek migration management infrastructure continued unabated. There still were unhy-
gienic conditions and an ongoing dearth of medical services in the detention sites them-
selves, and newly released, destitute migrants were resorting to camping out in their 
hundreds in the public spaces of cities across Greece (CPT, 2016). In the meantime, the 
government’s plan to construct open migrant ‘holding centres’ was blocked by the strict 
curtailment of public funds as asserted under the loan agreement with the Troika.
In March 2015, several high-ranking members of the government made highly publi-
cised comments indicating that Greece might further loosen its migration procedures to 
allow more migrants to travel on to Western Europe, thus posing a major challenge to the 
EU’s Schengen and Dublin Agreements. Between April and June that year, the European 
Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) went on to report record numbers of 
largely unregistered migrants and refugees transiting through the Western Balkans (an 
increase of 663 percent compared with the same period in 2014), who had entered the EU 
via Greece (Nestoras, 2016). In the summer months of 2015, states along the Western 
Balkan route began to close their borders and erect fences in response, leaving thousands 
of unregistered migrants trapped at the Greek frontier with FYROM. In May 2015, the 
EU responded with an Agenda for Migration, under which practical emergency assis-
tance was proposed to support the administration of irregular migration management in 
Greece and Italy, with €60 million allocated to boost reception capacity and healthcare 
across the two countries. In July, the EU agreed to accept a small increase in the number 
of refugees who would be resettled across the 27 member-states. But by the end of the 
month, 124,000 irregular migrants had arrived in Greece by sea alone, a 750 percent 
increase on the same period in 2014. Between 2015 and early 2016, Greece received an 
unprecedented influx of more than 1 million irregular migrants (Clayton, 2016). The 
abysmal living conditions of new arrivals led the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) to clas-
sify the situation as a humanitarian emergency, in the face of which Greece’s reception 
capacity, infrastructure, services and registration procedures clearly fell far short of 
needs (Cabot, 2018; Nestoras, 2016; Spindler, 2015).
The Greek government’s apparent hopes that its migration pressures might soften the 
EU’s stance over the punitive conditions of the Troika loan agreement came to nought. 
Instead, the EU put forward a proposal for a FRONTEX intervention to address the bor-
der crisis, and went on to negotiate a controversial deal with Turkey, concluded in March 
2016, according to which the Turkish side would be provided with financial aid to accept 
back from Greece and retain migrants not passing the threshold for refugee status. This 
deal was then forced upon the Syriza-led government through the threat of Greece’s 
expulsion from the Schengen regime, which would have been a blow to the country’s 
tourism-reliant economy (because overseas visitors would have been required to obtain 
a visa to enter Greece). The EU’s agreement with Turkey was formally accepted by 
Greece in the form of Law 4375/2016, which transformed ‘hotspot’ reception sites into 
de facto closed reception facilities, laying the framework for the continuous detention of 
irregular migrants during the mass, expedited processing of their claims and pending 
their expulsion. According to Article 14 of the law, new arrivals would be subject to 
restrictions on freedom of movement within the premises of the centres during the 
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reception and identification procedure. Although the provision did not refer to detention 
specifically, evidence from the conditions in facilities such as those in Evros and on the 
Greek islands demonstrated that those staying in RICs in practice became deprived of 
their liberty, in contravention of both EU and human rights provisions in relation to asy-
lum (Papadopoulou et al., 2016).
The three largest hotspots – on the islands of Lesvos, Chios and Samos – rapidly 
became overcrowded and conditions deteriorated dramatically, with insufficient shelter 
and food, poor sanitation and inadequate access to medical services. The government 
was subjected to international criticism in the winter of 2016-17 for its failure to use tens 
of millions of Euros of dedicated EU funding to properly prepare the camps on the 
islands for the impending harsh weather, or to evacuate all migrants to more appropriate 
conditions, leaving around half of the camp populations to cope in freezing conditions. 
The European Commissioner for Migration also pointed to the fact that no other country 
on the continent had as much access to EU Home Affairs funding as Greece did by that 
juncture (see, further, Howden and Fotiadis, 2017; Kingsley, 2016; Zafiropoulos, 2017). 
However, the implication that the EU was simply providing funds that were then mis-
managed by others was itself criticised. The Médecins Sans Frontières Head of Mission 
in Greece characterised the pronouncements from the Commission as scandalous, given 
that the camp at Moria was built with European money, two European agencies were 
operating in the centre (FRONTEX and European Asylum Support Office), and the over-
crowding of the camps was a direct consequence of the EU’s determination that migrants 
arriving on the islands not be allowed to travel to the Greek mainland (Zafiropoulos, 
2017; see also Kalpouzos and Mann, 2015). As if underscoring this very point, just a few 
months later, in March 2017, EU member-states resumed returns of migrants to Greece 
under the Dublin II Agreement.
By April 2018, there had been scant improvement in the treatment of detained irregu-
lar migrants and their living conditions. A visit by the CPT found that foreign nationals 
deprived of their liberty by the police under aliens’ legislation continued to be at risk of 
ill-treatment, particularly in the Evros region and on the Aegean islands. Fundamental 
legal safeguards against ill-treatment (for example, access to a lawyer) were rarely 
applied in practice and were generally ineffective. There was an almost total lack of 
interpretation services in all the establishments visited, and a chronic shortage of health-
care staff, medication and medical equipment. The CPT also criticised the inappropri-
ately carceral design of the migration sites, which included ‘omnipresent’ rolls of razor 
blade wire and high wire-mesh fences. Overcrowding and unsanitary conditions in some 
sites of detention were condemned as ‘appalling’ and ‘grossly sub-standard’. For the 
CPT, conditions amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, especially unsuitable for 
unaccompanied children, single and pregnant women, and families (CPT, 2019a).
Conditions of detention for irregular migrants steadily worsened over the course of 2019, 
up to and following the July elections which saw the exit of the Syriza-led government and 
the entry to office of New Democracy (CPT, 2019b). Although the policies and practices of 
immigrant detention were in some key human rights respects to worsen further from that 
point onwards (see, for example, Commissioner for Human Rights, 2019; UNHCR, 2019), 
it is evident that, by the end of the Syriza-led government’s tenure in office, its human rights 
agenda for migrant detention had dramatically failed to be realised.
Cheliotis and Xenakis 93
Conclusion
Our review of the relationship between the ideological orientation of government, eco-
nomic downturn and incarceration in Greece has revealed a complex picture.
To start with ideological orientation, although Syriza’s entry into office as the senior 
partner of a coalition in January 2015 marked a leftward shift in government following 
decades of centrist rule, the ways in which incarceration evolved in the country over the 
next four-and-a-half years were more often than not continuous with the excessively 
harsh trends of the preceding era. Turning to economic conditions, we similarly find that, 
although a tipping point in economic downturn and related societal hardship allowed the 
rise to power of a leftist anti-austerity party that was openly promising to foreground 
human rights and promote progressive change in matters of incarceration as well, eco-
nomic pressures triggered arrangements that acted retrogressively to restrict the govern-
ment’s scope to enact its agenda on the carceral front, as most starkly illustrated by the 
impact of severe externally imposed restraints on public expenditure.
To this extent, our analysis challenges pertinent international literature in certain 
respects while supporting it in others. In particular, although our findings problematise the 
view that harsh and worsening socio-economic conditions facilitate the ascent of political 
parties with a stronger commitment to public spending retrenchment or that they enable 
the mobilisation of cross-party support in this direction, it is confirmed that the political 
orientation of sitting parties cannot be relied upon to predict the evolution of carceral poli-
cies and practices, and that the role of government political orientation in this regard may 
be overridden by economic pressures. Equally, however, the case of Greece is one where 
fiscal constraints did not bring about a sustained reduction in the use of incarceration, 
although they did contribute to the further deterioration of carceral conditions.
Our analysis nevertheless also suggests a qualification to the emerging notion that 
economic decline outweighs the political orientation of incumbent governments to gen-
erate adverse carceral effects. If, rather than considering the reality and fiscal repercus-
sions of Greece’s economic decline solely at their most acute (that is, when Syriza was 
in office), one examines more broadly the years since the country went into recession, 
was plunged into a debt crisis and soon thereafter started receiving fiscally restrictive 
bailout loans from the Troika, then the carceral continuities one can observe between 
Syriza’s coalition government and its centrist predecessors during this period appear to 
further corroborate that economic downturn trumps political orientation as a determining 
factor in carceral policies and practices. For example, on successive occasions before 
Syriza rose to power, prison budgets had already been slashed and prisoner-focused 
expenditure overshadowed under the Troika’s tutelage (GSAP, 2017).
If, however, one takes a longer-term perspective, then one discovers that the conti-
nuities at least in levels and patterns of imprisonment (for example, swelling prison 
populations and rising human rights violations inside prisons) stretch back to an eco-
nomically stable period when centrist parties alternated in office. What this implies is 
that any pernicious influence subsequently exerted on incarceration by economic 
downturn and its fiscal repercussions was not axiomatically unrelated to the political 
orientation of the governments that ruled the country before Syriza’s coalition, nor, at 
any rate, did it necessarily clash with the overall plan they had meant to pursue on the 
fronts of imprisonment and immigration detention. Well before the Troika’s 
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intervention began, for example, per-prisoner expenditure was already systematically 
kept at profoundly inadequate levels, thereby in effect perpetuating terrible prison con-
ditions. One could argue, therefore, that government political orientation may actually 
be causally superior to economic downturn so long as there is equivalence between the 
two in terms of the carceral impact they would have independently of one another. In 
the absence of such equivalence, of course, economic downturn is indisputably more 
important in determining carceral outcomes.
Even so, it would be a manifest error to assume that economic downturn interacts with 
government political orientation alone. Further powerful forces may be at play, either 
constraining or, indeed, exacerbating the effects of economic downturn on carceral pol-
icy and practice. In the case of the Syriza-led government, we find that additional regres-
sive factors combined with economic conditions to further restrict the Syriza-led 
government’s ability to realise its aspirations for reforms either to conventional impris-
onment or to migrant detention. But whilst such factors manifested themselves on each 
of the policy fronts at issue, we conclude that they were not equally consequential, which 
also explains why the government was particularly unsuccessful in enforcing its agenda 
for migrant detention. In particular, the obstructive impact that judicial culture – or, 
rather, judicial political orientation – had on the government’s plans for prison reform 
was neither as insurmountable nor, indeed, as comprehensive as the obstacles that pres-
sure from the EU and changing international migration patterns posed for the change the 
government hoped to bring to the country’s immigration detention system.
This should not be read as implying that forces beyond the Troika that stemmed from 
the international sphere invariably stood in the way of government plans, nor, in any 
case, that they were always irresistible per se. True as it may be, as our analysis also 
shows, that the US actively tried to thwart the Greek government’s endeavour to liberal-
ise parole provisions in a way that was meant to reduce the use of custodial punishment 
and relieve prison overcrowding and associated problems, it is equally evident that the 
CPT and the ECtHR were very much in step with the government in their constant push 
for compliance with the ECHR across Greece’s carceral sites. As we proceed to demon-
strate, however, both of these efforts were frustrated, in stark contrast to the EU’s inter-
vention effectively in favour of severity – indeed, infringement of the European human 
rights regime – in Greek immigration detention matters. This confirms two key conclu-
sions from our previous research on the forces that have shaped the carceral policies and 
practices enacted in Greece over time: first, that just as international pressures may 
assume different and even contradictory forms, so too they may vary according to their 
respective causal import; and second, that the actual impact of external actors has pre-
dominantly been a negative one (see, further, Xenakis and Cheliotis, 2018).
To recap and elaborate, as far as conventional imprisonment is concerned, the Syriza-
led government not only ushered in a major change in state rhetoric around crime and 
punishment, it was also successful in abolishing maximum-security prisons, made a start 
in terms of promoting sorely needed drug rehabilitation programmes for prisoners, and, 
at least for a short while, managed to reduce overall prisoner numbers. In so doing, 
moreover, the government was able to resist select foreign pressure from the US not to 
liberalise the country’s parole system while at the same time taking steps towards 
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compliance with international human rights-oriented pressures from the CPT and the 
ECtHR. The role played by Syriza’s political orientation in this regard did not itself 
remain untouched by economic conditions, to the extent that using its power as the senior 
coalition partner to introduce and sustain progressive measures on the penal front addi-
tionally provided a key means by which the party could provide a tangible demonstration 
of its commitment to engendering a fundamental leftward shift in Greek politics and 
society against the background of lingering continuities on the economic front. This was 
the case both during its first few months in office, when uncertainty was mounting as to 
whether debt restructuring and an end to austerity were attainable, and even more so 
thereafter, following the much-reviled new loan agreement the government reached rela-
tively swiftly with the Troika in the summer of 2015. Similarly – and this applies to the 
junior coalition partner, too, which did not substantively oppose Syriza’s prison reform 
plans –, resistance to US pressure against the liberalisation of parole also furnished an 
opportunity to display resistance to undue external meddling in Greek domestic affairs at 
a juncture when the government was otherwise descending further into a humiliating 
state of economic subjugation to foreign powers. Yet economic pressures, including fis-
cal restrictions imposed by the Troika, concurrently limited the government’s ability to 
fund progressive prison reforms, which ultimately meant – in combination with the fact 
that prisoner numbers remained stubbornly high, largely as a result of judicial obstinacy 
– that conditions in Greek prisons continued to be dire.
On the immigration detention front, the scope for the Syriza-led government to 
achieve its progressive ambitions was even more limited – and from very early on at that. 
Here, too, Syriza was successful in bringing about a liberalising shift in pertinent state 
discourse, notwithstanding xenophobic views expressed in the media by the junior coali-
tion partner. Yet pressures placed on Greece by the EU as to how the country should deal 
with issues of migration, including how it could spend EU funds in this respect, worked 
to undermine the plans the senior coalition partner had for reforming the country’s immi-
gration detention system. Under concerted pressure from the EU, including notably the 
threat of what would have been an economically catastrophic expulsion from the 
Schengen accord, the Greek government was forced into stemming the outflows of irreg-
ular migrants towards Western Europe by recourse in effect to mass mandatory detention 
practices that contravened regional and international human rights law alike. This, com-
bined with the unprecedented magnitude of the influx of irregular migrants that Greece 
experienced from the mid-2010s onwards, meant that the use of immigration detention 
intensified during Syriza’s stay in office, save for a brief initial decline. So much so, 
indeed, that, despite an expansion in the overall capacity of the country’s immigration 
detention system, overcrowding and associated problems continued to bedevil detention 
sites around the country. Compounding the situation was the fact that detainees were 
increasingly kept under closed, prison-like conditions, itself yet another negative devel-
opment that bore the EU’s imprint, to the extent, first, that the Union’s deal with Turkey 
in 2016 turned existing ‘hotspot’ reception sites into de facto closed centres for future 
deportees; and second, that the much-needed EU funding set aside to support Greece’s 
management of its migration burden was essentially attached to curtailing the liberty of 
irregular migrants. All in all, then, it is not simply that the Syriza-led government’s polit-
ical orientation was overridden by prevailing economic conditions; it is also that Greece’s 
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ongoing economic woes and its deepening financial subordination to the European estab-
lishment allowed the EU to force upon the country policies and practices of immigration 
detention that suited the EU’s own political orientation. In other words, what proved 
decisive was not Syriza’s leftist ideology, or the ideological division within the coalition 
or even within Greece, but rather the ideological position taken by Greece’s EU partners, 
who maintained a resolute unwillingness to establish anything like a systematic dispersal 
resettlement arrangement across the Schengen area, and Greece’s clearly subordinate 
status in relation to them.
In essence, then, our analysis of Greek carceral policy and practice after the assump-
tion of office by a coalition led by Syriza goes beyond suggesting that economic down-
turn can place crucial limits on a government’s ability to execute progressive plans in 
carceral matters. We additionally conclude that a government’s scope of action in this 
vein may be further restricted depending on the autonomy it can wield in defiance not 
only of domestic opposition but also – and, in the Greek case, certainly more importantly 
– of foreign forces intervening in both economic and political realms. To put the point 
differently, just as foreign forces may combine with economic downturn (and domestic 
opposition, at that) to undermine a government’s agenda for progressive reform to car-
ceral policy and practice, the degree to which they might successfully do so is contingent 
upon the relative politico-economic might of the state that the government in question 
represents in the international sphere.
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Notes
1. Recent years have seen increasing recognition being paid to the need for studying state pun-
ishment – and, within this context, incarceration itself – with reference to a variety of indi-
cators so as to produce more holistic assessments (see, for example, Cavadino and Dignan, 
2006; Cheliotis and Xenakis, 2016; Karstedt, 2013; Newburn, 2020, in press; Tonry, 2007;).
2. The term ‘caseload’ refers to the total number of cases of individuals held in custody during 
a given year (see, further, Cheliotis, 2011). The article’s discussion of trends in the prisoner 
caseload and prison admissions is based on the authors’ re-analysis of data compiled and pub-
lished by the National Statistical Service of Greece (NSSG) on its freely accessible website 
(https://www.statistics.gr). For further information on the Greek prison system during the 
period under consideration, see Cheliotis (2011, 2012) and Cheliotis and Xenakis (2016).
3. On judicial culture and its conservative dimensions in Greece, see, further, Vagena-Palaiologou 
(2006).
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4. The bill was passed in April 2019. Formally speaking, it was temporary and was successfully 
renewed several times during the Syriza-led coalition government’s stay in office.
5. The trends and figures reported in this article in relation to prison budgets and payments are 
based on calculations made by the authors drawing on the most up-to-date data provided by 
the Greek Ministry of Finance at the time of writing.
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